1LT J. Kauffman Posted January 2, 2021 Share Posted January 2, 2021 WARNING ORDER Operation Enduring Freedom 005 Afghanistan - Nuristan Province - Kamdesh - 2009 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ SITUATION OPERATION TIME: 1900 EST IN-GAME TIME: 0400 IGT ORGANIZATION: 1. REGION: Kamdesh, Afghanistan 2. WEATHER: Clear Skies; 38F ; Wind <1kn NNE; Dawn 0415 IGT; Dusk 1900 IGT 3. TERRAIN: Mountains, Arid In 2006, a US supply convoy was ambushed and destroyed on an isolated MSR running through Kamdesh, an incredibly remote area just miles from the Pakistani border. Allied Commanders identified the location and established a outlying Combat Outpost and named it after the dead commander of the convoy, Lt Keating. COP Keating was positioned in a gorge, next to a small village, river, and surrounded on all four sides by four imposing mountains, running at a 60 degree angle up from the walls of Keating. Every soldier to lay eyes on COP Keating, immediately knew that serving there would be a death sentence. For three years frustrated commanders lobbied for the COP to be abandoned due to its compromising location. Ground resupply was completely impossible due to the loss of control of Nuristan province. Due to the altitude & height of the surrounding mountains, resupply birds could only reach Keating by flying at night through the valleys to avoid anti-aircraft fire from the insurgents who controlled the passes. Due to ground fire, bad weather in the mountain passes, Often resupply flights were turned back, and Keating was left to fend for itself undermanned, exposed, and ill-equipped for days on end. By 2008, it was decided that Keating would be abandoned on October 10th, 2009. By October, Alpha Company, 3rd Battalion, 71st Cavalry Regiment, who manned Keating, were bled dry from periodic attacks and lack of resupply. They had packed the majority of the Camps supplies into large shipping containers, as they were slated to leave Keating in a week. On October 2nd, Keating's commander and a platoon of the garrison were flown to a rural town in the area to give parting advice to the Afghan elders that had worked with the coalition forces in the area, leaving Keating further undermanned. Now down to two under strength platoons and their HQ element, within the walls of Keating, American soldiers had to rely on the platoon of ANA fighters to man half of the defenses. On October 3rd, one week before US troops were to be pulled out of Keating, a battalion of Taliban fighters surrounded the camp, and launched one final massive assault in an attempt to destroy the coalition garrison at Keating. Within 45 minutes of the fighting, Taliban forces had breached the wire of Keating and set fire to the Camp. The Afghan garrison fled the camp, and the remaining American soldiers fell back to the aid station, and the mess hall preparing to make their final stand. American forces held their positions against Taliban assaults on their structures and managed to launch a series of counter attacks with only a dozen combat effective men. They managed to repel the Taliban and hold for the 7 hours that it took air support to arrive at Keating (Another 6 until QRF and Medevac finally reached the camp). Eight were killed, with another forty wounded, COP Keating a. Enemy Disposition Heavy Disposition of Taliban Fighters Well equipped foreign fighters trained in Pakistan Anti-Air, Mortar, and Rocket emplacements b. Friendly Disposition ~ 30 Afghan National Army Incompetent Commander, unmotivated soldiers x 2 Latvian Special Operations Advisors Manning Camp Keating & OP Fritische c. 2000s - Rules of Engagement On order from your commander, enemy military and paramilitary forces are declared hostile and may be attacked subject to the following instructions: Positive Identification (PID) is required prior to engagement. PID is a reasonable certainty that the proposed target is a legitimate military target. If no PID, contact your next highest commander for decision. Do not engage anyone who has surrendered, or is unarmed or wounded. Any requests for fire support or close air support within 600 Meters of a civilian center must first get authorization from commanding officer. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Maps of the Province: Gun Truck I Gun Truck II Mortar Pit Photos of Keating Notes from Commander: All requests for Close Air Support/Medevac/Resupply/Insertion are to go to Mako 1-6 on FREQ 60.0. Mako 1-6 will contact Rattler 1-6 on FREQ 50.0 to request an asset to assist 1st Platoon as necessary. Once the asset is in the area of Operation for Mako 1-6, Infantry can contact the bird via CAS Net FREQ 45.0 to guide in the bird/direct close air support. If an infantry element is in threat of being overrun and requires immediate assistance, they may declare a "Tactical Emergency" to Mako 1-6, who will then have Rattler 1-6 redirect all available air assets to Mako 1-6's Area of Operation to prevent the unit from being overrun. Expect the enemy to utilize grenades when in close combat. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MISSION 1st Platoon, A. Company, 1/7th Cavalry 1st Platoon is tasked with conducting a quick foot patrol in the area, and guard COP Keating, while the Captain and 2nd Platoon are away, meeting with Afghan elders. 1st Platoon is tasked with manning both gun trucks and the mortar pit, while ANA Soldiers are responsible for manning the perimeter trench. 1st Platoon PRIMARY TASKING: 1st Platoon will man Gun Truck I, Gun Truck II, and the Mortar Pit. SECONDARY TASKING: 1st Platoon may send out a small patrol around the area at the start of the mission. TERTIARY TASKING: N/A 71st Assault Helicopter Company 71st AHC is not able to reach Keating for another week due to the inability to fly over the mountains & blizzards in the passes. PRIMARY TASKING: N/A SECONDARY TASKING: N/A TERTIARY TASKING: N/A ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ COMMAND & SIGNAL Call Signs "Mako 6", 1LT J. Kauffman "Mako 1-1" SSG A. Cummings "Mako 1-1 A", SGT B. Snurka "Mako 1-2 B", TBD "Mako 1-2 B", CPL N. Bobcat Hand Signals Control + Num 5 = Rally/Set//Affirmative Control + Num 2 = Halt/Hold/Stop/Negative Control + Num 6 = Engage Control + Num 4 = Go/Move/ Link to comment
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