2LT K. Grorud Posted May 31, 2021 Share Posted May 31, 2021 WARNING ORDER Operation Long Reach 002: Silver Bayonet I Central Highlands - II Corps - Ia Drang Complex - 1965 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ SITUATION OPERATION TIME: 1900 EST IN-GAME TIME: 1000 IGT ORGANIZATION: 1. REGION: Ia Drang, South Vietnam 2. WEATHER: Clear Skies; 38F ; Wind <1kn NNE; Dawn 0415 IGT; Dusk 1900 IGT 3. TERRAIN: Mountains, Highlands, Jungle Historical Context: By early 1965, the majority of rural South Vietnam was under limited Viet Cong (VC) control, increasingly supported by People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) regulars from North Vietnam. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) General William C. Westmoreland had secured the commitment of upward of 300,000 U.S. regulars from President Lyndon B. Johnson and a build-up of forces took place in the summer of 1965. VC forces were in nominal control of most of the South Vietnamese countryside by 1965 and had established military infrastructure in the Central Highlands, to the northeast of the Saigon region. Vietnamese communist forces had operated in this area during the previous decade in the First Indochina War against the French, winning a notable victory at the Battle of Mang Yang Pass in 1954. There were few reliable roads into the area, making it an ideal place for the VC forces to form bases, relatively immune from attack by the generally road-bound Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces. During 1965, large groups of PAVN regulars moved into the area to conduct offensive operations. Attacks to the southwest from these bases threatened to cut South Vietnam in two. By 1964 North Vietnam had established the B3 Front in the central highlands of South Vietnam. By early November 1965 three PAVN regiments – the 32nd, 33rd and 66th – and the H15 Local Force Battalion had been assembled in the area. The B3 Front commander, Maj. Gen. Chu Huy Man, planned to target South Vietnamese positions in Kon Tum and Pleiku provinces. The city of Pleiku was the location of the South Vietnamese II Corps headquarters, commanded by General Vinh Loc, who had at his disposal nine South Vietnamese battalions: four Ranger, three Airborne and two Marine. The U.S. command saw this as an ideal area to test new air mobility tactics.Air mobility called for battalion-sized forces to be delivered, supplied and extracted from an area of action using helicopters. Since the heavy weapons of a normal combined-arms force could not follow, the infantry would be supported by coordinated close air support, artillery and aerial rocket fire, arranged from a distance and directed by local observers. The new tactics had been developed in the U.S. by the 11th Air Assault Division (Test), which was renamed as the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). The division's troopers dubbed themselves the "Air Cav" (Air Cavalry) and in July 1965 began deploying to Camp Radcliff, An Khê, Vietnam By November, most of the division's three brigades were ready for operations. The U.S. deployment caused the B3 Field Front Command to bring forward an attack on the U.S. Army Special Forces Plei Me camp, some 45 km southwest of Pleiku, which was originally planned for December. The assault was instead launched October 19 with only two Regiments, the 32nd and 33rd, instead of the planned three, before the Air Cavalry troops were combat ready. The plan was to attack the camp with the 33rd Regiment while the 32nd Regiment would lie in wait to ambush the ARVN relief force that would inevitably be sent from Pleiku. Once the relief force was destroyed, the two regiments were to join and take the camp. The initial attack was repulsed with the help of strong air support, and a small relief force reinforced the camp on the morning of the 22nd. The main relief force, advancing south from Pleiku on route 6C, was duly ambushed at 18:00 the next day. After a two-hour battle the ambushing forces were beaten off, but the ARVN, discouraged from moving any further, set up a defensive position, and did not reach the camp at Plei Me until dusk on the 25th. The PAVN forces withdrew west towards the Chu Pong Massif. At the end of October, after the siege of Plei Me was lifted, General Westmoreland ordered General Kinnard to take his division on to the offensive and seize the initiative in Pleiku province. Initial operations were conducted by 1st Brigade, and on November 1 they captured a PAVN aid station south west of Plei Me. Further engagements over the next few days revealed the arrival of the PAVN 66th Regiment. Having taken increasing casualties, 1st Brigade was relieved by 3rd Brigade, the handover being completed over the period November 7–12. On November 11, intelligence source revealed the disposition of the three PAVN regiments: the 66th, the 33rd, and the 32nd. On November 12, the 3rd Brigade was given orders by General Stanley R. Larsen, I Field Force, Vietnam Commander and General Richard T. Knowles, 1st Air Cavalry Division Forward Headquarters Commander to prepare for "an air assault near the foot of the Chu Pongs" 14 miles (23 km) west of Plei Me. On November 13, 3rd Brigade Commander Colonel Thomas W. Brown, acting following the order issued by Gen. Larsen and Gen. Knowles, met with Lieutenant Colonel Hal Moore the commander of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, and told him "to conduct an airmobile assault the following morning” and to conduct search and destroy operations through 15 November. Meanwhile, an ARVN intelligence source by intercept of radio communication indicated that some PAVN B3 Field Front recon elements and transportation units had already moved out of their assembly areas to attack the Pleime camp. After Air Assaulting into LZ X-Ray, 1/7 Cav captured an enemy radio operator, detailing the area around LZ X-Ray. Before they knew it, the enemy were upon them. Accurate fire of AK's and SKS's, pushed 1/7 CAV back into the LZ, where they entrenched themselves for the oncoming storm. All the platoons managed to hold fast, and the LZ remained open for the entire day. As starting to evacuate would seal the fates of the last soldiers out, 1/7 Cav and D. Jordan decided to RON and take the fight to the enemy. With knowledge of where the enemy HQ is located 1/7 CAV is ready to repel the first attack before assaulting the PAVN/VC HQ. a. Enemy Disposition Heavy disposition of PAVN regulars Well equipped regular soldiers Light - Mechanized Force Anti-Air and Mortar emplacements Heavy disposition of Vietcong Irregulars Ill-Equipped but seasoned Guerrillas Fanatical; Threat of suicide bombers b. Friendly Disposition 1st & 2nd Platoon, Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment 3 Platoon of Airmobile infantry FSB Falcon, as well as fixed wing support c. 1960s - Rules of Engagement On order from your commander, enemy military and paramilitary forces are declared hostile and may be attacked subject to the following instructions: Positive Identification (PID) is required prior to engagement. PID is a reasonable certainty that the proposed target is a legitimate military target. If no PID, contact your next highest commander for decision. Do not engage anyone who has surrendered, or is unarmed or wounded. Any requests for fire support or close air support within 600 Meters of a civilian center must first get authorization from commanding officer. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Maps of the Province: AO 71st AHC HQ Notes from Commander: All requests for Close Air Support/Medevac/Resupply/Insertion are to go to Mako 1-6 on FREQ 60.0. Mako 1-6 will contact Rattler 1-6 on FREQ 50.0 to request an asset to assist 1st Platoon as necessary. Once the asset is in the area of Operation for Mako 1-6, Infantry can contact the bird via CAS Net FREQ 45.0 to guide in the bird/direct close air support. If an infantry element is in threat of being overrun and requires immediate assistance, they may declare a "Tactical Emergency" to Mako 1-6, who will then have Rattler 1-6 redirect all available air assets to Mako 1-6's Area of Operation to prevent the unit from being overrun. Expect the enemy to utilize grenades when in close combat. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MISSION 1st Platoon, A. Company, 1/7th Cavalry 1st Platoon will resume where they were left at the RON, and will push the enemy out of the area. 1st Platoon PRIMARY TASKING: 1st Platoon will perform a counter-attack against the PAVN and VC in the vicinity of LZ X-RAY, OBJ Anaconda & Cobra. SECONDARY TASKING: 1st Platoon will sweep the nearby village of SEG BEGAT, OBJ Rattlesnake TERTIARY TASKING: 1st Platoon will secure any documents detailing enemy movements 71st Assault Helicopter Company Rattlers are to support 1st Platoon as they Air Assault and Search & Destroy in the Ia Drang Valley PRIMARY TASKING: Provide Reinserts, Emergency CAS, Ressuply, and Medevac. SECONDARY TASKING: TERTIARY TASKING: ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ COMMAND & SIGNAL Call Signs "Mako 6", 2LT K. Grorud "Mako 1-6", 1LT J. Kauffman "Mako 1-6R" SSG A. Cummings "Mako 1-1", SSG D. Jordan "Mako 1-2", SSG V. HandbergTBD "Rattler 1-1" "Rattler 1-2" WO1 J. Hart Hand Signals Control + Num 5 = Rally/Set//Affirmative Control + Num 2 = Halt/Hold/Stop/Negative Control + Num 6 = Engage Control + Num 4 = Go/Move/ Role selection: OPORD: Head of 71st Assault Helicopter Company Call-sign: Rattler 1-6 Link to comment
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